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As Europe’s fiscal union marches on, it is time for the
centre-left to debate what it can do to make the eurozone
more progressive
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While the EU edges ever closer to fiscal federalism, it still lacks a federal budget, which
would be able to assist areas of the eurozone that are in economic difficulty. Dan Corry
argues that in the absence of a eurozone-wide federal budget, Europe’s centre left must
begin to consider and debate measures that would help struggling regions, such as more
progressive taxes and an EU-wide unemployment benefit scheme.
Slowly, slowly, bit by bit and sometimes in big leaps, the EU – or at least the Eurozone –
is moving towards a stronger f iscal union. This has always been inevitable to some
degree; monetary unions, where the currency is shared and there is only one interest rate, almost always
need f irm f iscal discipline to be enf orced. If  you don’t have it then you have all sorts of  perverse
incentives playing out with strong, surplus countries f eeling they are paying f or the ‘f ree-riding’ of  the
weaker countries who no longer have currency risk and can borrow at lower rates due to being
‘enveloped’ by the stronger countries. The inf amous Maastricht condition of  3% budget def icit policed by
various f orms of  multi- lateral surveillance and f ines was an early attempt to bring some elements of  a
f iscal union to the table. But when it came to the crunch its set of  exhortations backed up by f ines and
penalties turned out to be too litt le.
The great banking crash and the subsequent Great Recession have f orced the pace of  what might
otherwise have been a gradual move over t ime to something closer to f iscal f ederalism. Now the screw is
being tightened. Countries in the Eurozone will have less f reedom. Banks will be supervised at an EU
level; Eurobonds of  some f orm or another will emerge; and the so called 6 pack of  new regulations will
constrain countries much more in how much they can operate an independent f iscal policy.
For the centre lef t this raises some big
problems. Within most currency unions
(be that the USA or Germany, the UK or
France) there is an ability through a
strong national or f ederal budget and
other policy measures to help particular
parts of  the monetary union area in
economic dif f iculty. However, the EU
looks unlikely to have a f ederal budget
of  anything like the scale needed to
ensure some sort of  equity, not least
in response to shocks (known as
asymmetric shocks) that hit one part of
the monetary union f ar more than
others.
There are of  course limited measures
in place already, like the Structural
Funds, that f inancially support areas of  lower prosperity in an ef f ort to get them onto a path to higher
productivity and thus higher incomes. But these are limited and are not f lexible enough instruments to
help deal with things like the economic cycle. In any case their scale is limited by the polit ical realit ies.
So if  we cannot achieve a larger f ederal budget then perhaps we need to look at some of  the other
things that are used in monetary unions to help out in this way. Clearly one is a progressive tax system.
Progressive taxation does a lot of  the work in most countries in helping the worst of f  and individuals and
areas hit by a particular downturn in the economy: those on low incomes have money ‘given’ to them
through tax on those better of f . But anything like this remains a pipe dream (or nightmare) f or the EU or
Eurozone. So too does some sort of  overall common social security system.
More promising might be another measure normally present in monetary unions which is unemployment
compensation. This idea is currently being given a push in the EU – including by the Employment
Commissioner Laszlo Andor who has talked about it as serving as an automatic stabiliser and argued
that “We need and must study the possible set-up of  such a European unemployment benef it scheme as
we develop the next phase of  Economic and Monetary Union”. Such an idea deserves a good look.
The basic concept arises f rom the observation that if  a member state is af f ected by slower growth f or a
period then it is likely to have higher unemployment. If  the f unding of  the compensation paid to
unemployed workers is EU or Eurozone wide then it is more likely that in ef f ect it comes f rom the more
prosperous areas and better of f  cit izens. It is thus a redistributive tool, even if  one slightly hidden
(although hardly a ‘stealth’ measure). Surely this is something the lef t should be pushing f or.
Well, like any idea it will have massive polit ical problems in getting those likely to have to be net
contributors to agree to it. Some – including the European Commission – have tried to argue that since it
will be designed only to help with the economic cycle which all member state f ace if  at dif f erent t imes,
there will be no net redistribution over t ime across countries.  But, we should put these problems aside
f or the moment and decide whether it is worth f ighting f or.
The technical issues are great. It is hard to imagine that it could be a f ixed amount in every country – it
will somehow have to relate to average wages in the relevant country. The same would go f or
contributions. There are also major issues as to whether it can operate when there are such very varied
rules about the basis on which unemployment compensation is paid across the EU and even what labour
market institutions they have. To take the most obvious example, dif f erent countries pay unemployment
compensation f or dif f erent lengths of  t ime and have dif f erent systems of  incentives and sanctions to
get people of f  benef its. Without harmonising this across the EU/Eurozone there are severe problems
(although trying to harmonise them would cause even more!). But perhaps to side step all this, the
EU/Eurozone wide scheme could pay a certain minimum amount f or a f ixed, short(ish) period given
certain minimum conditions: in ef f ect it would be the bedrock scheme which member states then added to
and supplemented.
Others would argue that the way a country organises it ’s labour market matters too. So if  a country had
a higher minimum wage than another, or more restrictions on hiring, then it could be stoking up
unemployment in some circumstances (although this too is contested of  course). Again the minimum idea
seems the only way f orward.
Finding a way to f und such an EU/Eurozone wide unemployment compensation scheme is another
challenge. Some suggest taxes on labour or a supplement to VAT. Others f ind yet another use f or the
bonanza that a Financial Transaction Tax might bring.
Would any of  this have an impact on the things we are trying to tackle?
This is hard to tell. A recent Bruegel paper (See Box 1) reviewed recent evidence f or the impact of
unemployment compensation across monetary unions in addressing regional shocks, including the US.
From one angle the f indings are disappointing: the ef f ects were pretty small. But they were clearly
posit ive and were at least a small contribution to equalising things up when the ability to devalue and set
your own interest rate has been removed. None of  this could do much about the severe shocks –
asymmetrically f elt – that the banking crisis caused. That is way too big f or such a gentle mechanism.
Perhaps more important than this though is that it is a recognition that the EU owes it ’s cit izens these
sort of  mechanisms if  it  is to ask them to participate in a t ight monetary and f iscal union. If  a helpf ul
(albeit small) payment came f rom Europe it could only help cit izens develop a more concrete
understanding of  the gains f rom EU membership than the harder to grasp  gains f rom trade and the
internal market. And it is something that the countries who will end up paying should and might accept as
a small ‘payment’ f or the benef its that the single currency gives them and the problems a f iscal union
causes f or weaker countries.
At this point, as the f iscal union marches on, the centre- lef t has been pretty quiet on suggesting what it
might do to make it a f iscal union that is in some sense progressive. Here at least is something to
debate – seriously. We should get on with it.
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